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2David H. Pyle*
Bank deregulation has increased the need for deposit insurance re-
form. In particular, ithas enhancedthe opportunitiesfor insured institu-
tions to exploit risk-taking incentives in the existing deposit insurance
system. Many reform proposalsfocus on ways ofpricing the risk that is
not now differentially priced. A comparative statics analysis of the
insurer's liability, applying options theory, suggests that improvedmoni-
toring and control of bank activities to prevent insolvency is more
important.
Lotsofpeople are talking about deposit insurance
reform because, as deposit insurance is structured
and administered, it may be incompatible with a
deregulated banking system. I Congress, while
responsible for the heightened inter.est, does not
seem to be doing anything about it. The Gam-St
Germain Act of 1982 required federal insurers to
study the deposit insurance system. The agencies
responded with over 500 pages of text and tables
that may be only the first ofa flood. At least three
articles on deposit insurance have appeared since
the agency reports were released (Horvitz, 1983;
Peterson 1983; and Kane, 1983a), and more are
forthcoming (Campbell and Glenn, 1983; Campbell
and Horvitz, 1983).
Why add to this torrent of words? Chiefly, to
report some new evidence on the cost of deposit
guarantees that is relevant to deposit insurance
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reform (Section II), but also to comment on ways
that bank deregulation makes reform more
imperative (Section 1). One hopes that adding to the
evidence may help move Congress and the bank
regulators toward useful action (Section III).
Legislation in progress
There is little sign that the 98th Congress will
enact deposit insurance reform. The Financial
Institutions DeregulationActintroduced by Senator
Gam for the Treasury does not address this topic. 2
Neither did SenatorGam include deposit insurance
reform in his" omnibus" banking bill, the proposed
Financial Services Competitive Equity Act
introduced in November 1983. There are proposals
to alleviate symptoms of the ailing insurance
system: Congressman St Germain's proposal to
regulate deposit brokers and the attempt in the
Treasury bill to come to grips with the elusive
"non-bank" bank. The Federal Deposit Insurance
Improvements Actintroduced by Senators Gam and
Proxmire for the FDIC does propose some reforms,
but since they were not incorporated into Senator
Gam's omnibus bill, it is not clear how they will
fare in Congress. Even if they had been
incorporated, the premium risk adjustmentproposed is limited to the rebate of net FDIC
assessment income. This may not be enough to
produce effective risk-related premiums. The FDIC
bill would also establish payment priorities in
liquidation proceedings, but it does not address the
critical problem ofcontrolling the liquidating value
offailing institutions. 3
In contrast to the inaction on deposit insurance
reform, legislation intended to further the banking
deregulation process continues to be introduced.
Since deregulation is being driven by market forces
that have proved hard to restrain, it is likely that we
will have more bank deregulation whether or not
there is Congressional action on proposed
legislation. We therefore need to know whether the
existing deposit insurance system is compatible
with a deregulated banking system and, if reform
were needed, how it should be structured.
I. Deregulation and the Need for Deposit Insurance Reform




revolved around the objection that the current
system of flat-rate insurance premiums encourage
risk-taking by insured institutions. Defenders ofthe
system are not convinced that these institutions
have taken significant advantage of this built-in
incentive to take risk. I was recently asked why
anyone should worry about the risk-taking
incentives of a deposit insurance system that has
remained solvent through the exigencies ofthe last
50 years. My answer is twofold. First, there may be
reason to question its solvency. Kane (l983b)
estimated the net worthofinsured S&Ls and mutual
savings banks at minus 100 to 175 billion dollars in
December 1981. Interestrates have fallen since then
so the immediate threat to the funds has decreased,
but it is prudentto remember that the laws ofgravity
do not apply to interest rates.
Second, and more relevant, today's financial
environment differs markedly from that of the last
50 years. The banking system has changed in
fundamental and permanent ways, and these
changes make it easier for insured institutions to act
on the risk-taking incentives of deposit insurance.
The pronounced interest rate volatility ofthe 1970s
and early 1980s was an important difference in the
environment, but perhaps a transitory one. The
changes resulting from the deregulation offinancial
services that began with the Depository Institutions
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of1980,
however, show no signs of ending. They are, in
large measure, responses to market forces that do
not appear to be abating, let alone reverting.
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Moreover, insurerinsolvencyperse is not themajor
reason for concern about the deposit insurance
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system. The more important consideration is that
the failure to price deposit insurance correctly leads
to allocative inefficiencies. Even if deposit
insurance premiums were correct on average so that
the funds were solvent, allocative inefficiencies
could remain flaws in the present deposit insurance
system. The rest of this section contains a
discussion of some ways that deregulation has
intensified the need for deposit insurance reform.
Asset deregulation
Excessive creditrisk has not been the majorcause
of bank failures over the past 50 years, the Penn
Square debacle and the continuing LDC loan scare
notwithstanding. Leverage risk, interest rate risk,
and fraud have been more important. The secular
increase in interest rate levels and volatility has
troubled many institutions, but increased interest
rate risk may not be a permanent problem and, in
any case, is a manageableone since interestrate risk
can be hedged. It is arguable, however, that the
measurement of interest rate risk is a less serious
problem for the insurers than measurement ofcredit
risk orthe detection offraud. 6
Is the bank risk experience ofthe pasta harbinger
of the future? Much of the thrust of asset
deregulation, past and proposed, points in the other
direction. Savings and loan holding companies, for
example, have been authorized to engage in a broad
range of activities, including real estate
development, credit, life and health insurance.
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The Financial Institutions Deregulation Act
proposes to extend similar powers to bank holding
companies. Although these new asset and
product-line powers may have been intended to
increase asset diversification, they also create thepotential for increased risk-taking by insured
institutions.
Deposit deregulation
Congress, through the Depository Institutions
Deregulation Committee, has eliminated most
deposit rate ceilings. The resulting flow of funds
into the deregulated accounts has been amazing. ~
More changes, including interest on all demand
deposits, are proposed. Whether this will increase
liability costs at banks and thrifts in the long run is
an open question. Depositors may justreceive more
direct interest and less implicit interest in the form
offree or subsidized services. At the minimum, the
response time to market rate changes will be
shortened. Existing institutions must learn to
manage new trade-offs between deposit rates and
deposit services. They will have to do so while
competing with entrants free of the physical and
mental trappings suited to a more regulated era.
Airline executives should be able to advise bankers
on this problem.
Brokered deposits
New entrants into the banking field, and many
older firms, have discovered brokered deposits as a
means to expand their deposit draw beyond their
own geographically limited areas. The deposit
broker obtains funds from investors throughout the
country and channels them to the client depository
institutions, assigning title for the deposit in
separate units, up to the insurance limit of$100,000,
to anumber ofdifferent investors. Withdeposit rate
deregulation, banks can offer a higher yield on
brokered deposits as an enticement. Those
institutions that want to engage in increased
risk-taking, therefore, need not wait for local
deposit growth to provide the funding. 9 Moreover,
their deposit draw is no longer limited to those who
know the institutions well. This situation, without
question, presents a serious problem for insurers.
Another problem with brokered deposits is that
the insurer, in effect, has replaced the Federal
Reserve as the lender of last resort. A bank in
trouble can go to the brokered deposit market
insteadofthe discount window for liquidity. This is
quite rational behavior when the insurers offer
failing institutions a bargain insurance rate on the
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brokered deposits while the Federal Reserve wants
good collateral for loans at the discount window.
Access to a national deposit market may be anew
and heady thing for smaller banks, but it is old hat
for large banks. They have tapped the money
market for some years both by direct and brokered
placement of large, mostly uninsured CDs. Given
the revealed behavior of bank regulators, a large
bank's lenders have been confident oftheir deposits'
safety. With the notable exception of Penn Square
National Bank, large bank failures have been
resolved with no losses for uninsured depositors.
This has resulted in less than full risk-pricing of
deposit liabilities for banks issuing large
denomination CDs. The introduction of insured
deposit brokerage may well be an important
concern for the deposit insurers, but so is the direct
or brokered sale of "uninsured" deposits that are
thus implicitly insured.
Making insured deposit brokerage more difficult
does not solve the problems deposit brokerage pre-
sents. Instead, it risks cutting off an economically
efficient deposit-gathering mechanism. An analogy
may help make the point. When large banks began
to use large computers, it was suggested that scale
economies in computing would drive small banks
out of business. This has not happened because a
large computer does not have to be owned directly
by a small bank for the bank to use competitively
priced computer services; the small bank can pur-
chase them. Similarly, by pooling the deposit offer-
ings of a number of banks, a deposit broker un-
couples size and access to national deposit markets.
The flaw lies in the mispricing of deposit guaran-
tees, whether explicitorimplicit, for large banks as
well as small, and not in the deposit marketing
mechanism.
Deposit deregulation and the liability mix
There is a positive aspect to deposit deregulation
from the regulator's viewpoint in that it may help
regulators enforce capital adequacy standards. The
removal of deposit rate ceilings undermines the
argument that deposits are acheapersourceoffunds
than otherbankliabilities. Even before deposit rates
were deregulated, Black, Miller, and Posner (1978)
made a convincing case that capital requirements
are not a costly form ofbank regulation. The basicidea is that competition among banks for deposits
will drive the total return on deposits into
equilibrium with the cost ofother sources offunds.
If the substitute liabilities were subordinated to
deposits, they may pay a higherreturn than deposits
just as in othercorporations subordinated debt pays
a higherreturn than seniordebt, and equity a higher
return that subordinateddebt. In none ofthese cases
is the higher required return an economic cost to the
issuer as long as it is consistent with the risk borne
by that class of investor. Considerations such as
taxes, corporate control, and financial flexibility
may influence the choice between debt and equity.
If the bank is free to use both debt and equity
liabilities in place ofdeposits, these considerations
do not influence the choice between deposits and
otherliabilities. 10
When deposit rate ceilings were binding, the
industry was forced into non-rate competition. It is
conceivable that this non-rate competition was less
than perfect, and that it allowed at least some banks
to raise funds at the margin at lower cost than by
issuing deposits. The elimination of deposit rate
ceilings has made full rate competition possible
again. If marginal deposits are bargains when full
rate competition is possible, it is because some bank
markets are not fully competitiveorbecausedeposit
insurance premiums are insufficient to cover the
insurer's deposit guarantee liability. Regulatory
policies regarding capital adequacy standards
should not allow depository institutions to take
advantage ofthese sources ofdeposit''cheapness."
Geographic deregulation
There has been no systematic deregulation ofthe
geographic restrictions on banking, yet we have
gone a long way toward removing those
restrictions. Market forces, acting through loan
production offices, money market mutual funds,
deposit brokers, nonbank banks, electronic banking
networks, and other channels, continue to push the
banking system in this direction.
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Bank regulators have aided the process of
geographic deregulation. Before 1978, a foreign
bank could obtain charters in more than one state. A
number did and were "grandfathered" when this
loophole in geographic regulation was closed in the
International Banking Actof1978. More recently,
geographic deregulation has been fostered by
interstate acquisitions of troubled institutions. The
explicit authorization of interstate acquisitions in
the Gam-St Germain Act of 1982 confirmed a
process of extraordinary acquisition in use by the
federal agencies. Notable examples include the
1-981 acquisition of two out-of-state institutions by
the California-based Citizens Savings (since
metamorphosed into First Nationwide Savings) and
the Citicorp acquisition of Fidelity Savings and
Loan ofSan Francisco immediately before the 1982
Act was approved. Since the 1982 Act, there have
been additional out-of-state acquisitions, including
two more proposed thrift acquisitions (in Chicago
and Miami) by Citicorp.
Interstate franchises and insurance funds
Together, market forces and regulatory policies
are breaking down the barriers to interstate banking.
As these barriers fall, the value of a multi-state
franchise falls too. This has an important
implication for the deposit insurance funds. The
major bidders for troubled institutions have often
been out-of-state firms. Over the past two years or
so, they have resulted in more than a dozen interstate
acquisitions. The out-of-state bidders made offers
that included the value ofa multi-state franchise as
well as the value of the troubled firm's asset
portfolio. If the insurers had been unable to offer a
significant relaxation ofgeographic barrierstothese
bidders, does anyone doubt that the insurance funds
would be smaller today?
When we achieve full geographical deregulation,
de facto or de jure, the deposit insurance agencies
will not have valuable multi-state franchises to sell.
They will then have to bear the full brunt of the
shortfall in asset value in failed institutions.II. Targets for Deposit Insurance Reform
The preceding arguments suggest that bank
deregulation has increased the need for deposit
insurance reform. Ifso, how should that reform be
structured? A central theme ofthe arguments about
the effects of deregulation is that deregulation has
increased the opportunity for insured institutions to
respond to the risk-taking incentives in the current
deposit insurance contract. The proposed reforms
have correspondingly focused on bank risk and the
pricing of risk, as in risk-related premiums. This
view of the reform process, especially the use of
risk-related premiums, has its critics, who think
reform should focus more on the process by which
the insurers monitor and control the net worth of
insured institutions.
A framework for comparing these alternative
views on deposit insurance reform can be built
around the conceptofthe deposit insurer's liability.
An insurerofa bank's deposits has a liability ifthat
bank could become insolvent, and if, at that time,
the value of the bank's assets do not sufficiently
coverthe deposit guarantee. Bank asset risk and the
insurer's insolvency policies are therefore major
determinants ofthis liability.
Consider the effects of bank asset risk. Since
bank monitoring is costly, the insurer (or a
surrogate) examines a bank at discrete intervals. If
the bank's assets are risky (from the insurer's
viewpoint), there will be a positive probability that
the value ofthose assets will fall below the deposit
guarantee before the next examination. The more
volatile the value ofa bank's assets, the more likely
that this event will occurand the larger the potential
shortfall could be. Recognizing this, analysts
suggest that deposit insurance reform should
include risk-related insurance premiums. However,
the critics are not convinced. They argue that
risk-related premiums would be hard to implement
because measuring risk on non-traded assets is
difficult. II Nonetheless, the failure to maintain
consistency between bank asset risk and the
insurancepremium is aflaw in the deposit insurance
system that is likely to be aggravated by bank
deregulation.
Horvitz (1983) has made a thoughtful case against
risk-related premiums. A main partofhis argument
is the distinction between the risk of bank failure
9
and the risk ofinsurer loss: "Thekey point...is that
ifinsured institutions are operating with positive net
worth, and the insurance agency is able to monitor
their condition, then the risk ofloss to the agency is
low, regardless of the riskiness of individual
institutions." 12 This argument emphasizes the
important protection given lenders by their right to
force insolvency proceedings. Unfortunately, bank
and thrift regulators have not always exercised this
right in a way that is consistent with a low risk of
loss. They often did not deal promptly with failing
institutions whose market net worth reached zero.
There are a number of reasons for this. One is the
divided responsibility among insurers and
regulators. 13 A second is the the use ofbook value
net worth standards. The failure to mark fixed-rate,
long-term assets to market in a period of rising
interest rates allowed numerous institutions to
remain in business after their economic net worth
had fallen below zero. Once many institutions were
in this position, concern overthe effects ofhaving a
large number fail at the same time strengthened the
regulators' reluctance to enforce more realistic
insolvency controls. A similar problem has
developed with respect to the reliance on book value
net worth in banks with a significantfraction oftheir
assets in loans to less-developed countries.
The prospect that a bank will not be declared
insolvent as soon as its market net worth has been
found to reach zero or less is an important
determinant of the insurer's current deposit
guarantee liability. A net worth standard that
permits negative market net worth tends to make the
date of insolvency later than it would be under a
zero market net worth standard. It thereby reduces
the present value of agivenfuture shortfall in asset
value relative to the deposit guarantee. This effect,
however, is morethan offsetby the increased sizeof
the potential shortfall. The neteffectofthe failure to
use market value net worth standards in declaring
insolvency therefore is an increase in the present
value ofthe insurer's liability.
The Deposit Insurer's Liability
Recent research on the valuation of the deposit
insurer's liability canshed some light on therelative
importance of asset risk control and insolvencycontrol in deposit insurance reform. Merton (1977,
1978) pioneered the use ofoptions theory to model
deposit insurance. A recent extension ofthis model
(Pyle, 1983) provides the basis for a comparative
statics analysis ofthe insurer's liability. The model
is described in the appended box.
The insurer's guarantee is modelled as a per-
petuity. This assumption is not essential to obtain a
closed-form solution (see Pyle, 1983), but it does
allow one to obtain more useful comparative statics
results than can be obtained from a single-period
model. As noted earlier, if the insolvency ratio is
reduced, the probability ofreaching insolvency be-
fore the next audit is reduced. But, in essence, this
just puts off the date of the insurer's potential loss
while increasing its size. In the short run, the
reduced likelihood ofearly insolvency has asignifi-
canteffecton the valueofthe liability. By analyzing
a perpetual guarantee, one can obtain the long-run
effect (and hence, the full effect) ofa given insol-
vency policy on the insurer's liability.
Given some simplifying assumptions, standard
options theory can be used to find an equation for
the present value of the insurer's liability. 15 This
value depends on several variables: the interest
spread (over the riskless market interest rate) on
deposits, the ratio ofthe market value ofthe bank's
assets to the face value ofthe insured deposits, the
frequency of examination, the examination costs,
the riskiness of the insured bank's assets and the
insolvency ratio. The insolvency ratio, as the term
is used here, is the ratio ofthe market value ofassets
to the face value of deposits below which a bank
will be declared insolvent. This variable and the
riskiness ofthe insured bank's assets are ofspecific
interest in our evaluation of deposit insurance
reform proposals.
The role of asset risk in determining the size of
the insurer's liability is straightforward. The
measure of asset risk in the model is the standard
deviation of asset return per unit time. For given
values ofthe other determinants ofthe liability, the
largerthis standarddeviation is, the more likely that
the value ofthe assets will be below any given value
(less than the mean) when the next examination
takes place. Since the insurer's liability depends on
these lower tail outcomes, the size of that liability
will increase with increases in asset risk. The
to
magnitude ofthe standard deviation ofasset return,
or, as it is also called, the asset return volatility,
depends on the types ofassets held by the bank. To
put this in perspective, the average asset return
volatility for common stocks is on the orderof0.2to
0.3 (20 percent to 30 percent per year), while the
return volatility for long-term U.S. Treasury bonds
has been estimated to be 0.05 to 0.06(5 percentto 6
percent per year). Asset return standard deviations
of .07 and .10 have been used in the numerical
examples in this paper.
The bank's asset portfolio is the underlying asset
on which the insurance contract is written. The asset
value at which an options contract may be exercised
is called the exercise price. Clearly, the exercise
price is an important determinant of the current
value of the option. The comparable variable in the
deposit insurance model is the insolvency ratio-the
asset value (at market) to deposit ratio below which
abank will be declared insolvent. Thesmaller is this
"exercise price", the larger is the insurer's
liability. For example, suppose the bank regulator
uses a book value insolvency rule. A bank will be
closed, merged, or reorganized if its asset book
value to deposit ratio falls below some number, say
1.03. If book value overstates market value by 15
percent, the book value insolvency rule translates
into a true insolvency ratio of 0.875. The insurer
will claim assets worth only $0.875 for each dollar
ofdeposits that must be paid off. There will be some
probability that the value ofthe bank's assets will be
insufficient to cover deposit claims at the next audit
for any reasonable value of the insolvency ratio.
The present value of this potential shortfall is the
amount of the insurer's liability. If the true
insolvency ratio implied by the regulator's rule is
0.875 instead of 1.0, the magnitude of that present
value will be larger.
Before reporting our results on the relative
importance ofasset risk and the insolvency ratio as
determinants of the insurer's liability, a few
additional comments on the model are in order.
The insurer's guarantee is modelled as a
perpetuity. This assumption is not essential to
obtain a closed-form solution (see Pyle, 1983), but
it does allow one to obtain more useful comparative
statics results than can be obtained from a single-
period model. As noted earlier, if the insolvencyratio is reduced, the probability of reaching
insolvency before the next audit is reduced. But, in
essence, this just puts off the date of the insurer's
potential loss while increasing its size. In the short
run, the reduced likelihoodofearly insolvency has a
significant effect on the value of the liability. By
analyzingaperpetualguarantee, one can obtain the
long-run effect(and hence, the full effect) ofagiven
insolvency policy on the insurer's liability.
The usefulness of the model is limited by the
assumptions on which it is based. Two limiting
assumptions are worthy of special note. First, the
perpetuity assumption conflicts with the
assumption that asset risk is constant. In fact, asset
risk is achoice variable for the insuredbank (subject
to regulatory constraints) and the bank may change
its risk policy during the period of the guarantee.
The longer the period for which the guarantee
holds, the harder it is to acceprthe assumption that
asset risk is constant. This limitation of the model
will certainly affect the measured value of the
insurer's liability. Its effect on the relative
importance ofasset risk and the insolvency ratio in
determining the size ofthe liability is not obvious.
Second, the analysis also requires that the policy
regarding the true insolvency ratio be known. Since
this is a choice variable for the regulators, it should
be known in principle. In fact, the true insolvency
ratio that will be used for a given institution is
probably not known in advance. For example, if a
book value insolvency ratio is used, the market
value insolvency ratio is a random variable. There is
no clearway to deal with this problem in the context
of the model. Again it is not clear what effect, if
any, this has on the comparative statics analysis of
the insurer's liability.
Given these considerations, the results from the
modelshould be approachedwith some caution. 16 It
seems clearthatviolationofsomeofthe simplifying
assumptions would have a significant effect on the
measured value ofthe insurer's liability. However,
the comparison between asset risk (<:T) and the
insolvencyratio (<1» was carried out in termsofthe
ratio.of the .'.'price" elasticities of these two
parameters. This measure is independent of the
specific insurer liability values generated by the
model, but not of any biases that the simplifying
assumptions may have induced in the partial
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derivatives of the insurer's liability valuation
function.
Asset Risk, the Insolvency Ratio, and
Deposit Insurance Liability
Equation (2) in the boxed insert is the model of
the insurer's liability that was used to analyze the
effect of asset risk and the insolvency ratio on that
liability. The partial derivatives of the liability
[PI(X)] with respect to <:T and 1> were derived and
used to obtain the two elasticity measures, e" and
ed>' These elasticities were evaluated for various
values ofthe parameters.
Audit frequency is a random variable with amean
(A) of one (an audit is expected to occur once per
year). Audit costs of I, 10 and 100 basis points per
dollar of deposits 17 and two asset volatilities, 7
percent per year and 10 percent per year, were
considered. 18
The point elasticities for the insolvency ratio
(measured at <1> = 1) and for asset risk (measured at
<:T = 0.07 and <:T = 0.10) are given in columns 4 and
5 of Table I. These elasticities measure the
percentage change in the present value of the
insurer's liability for a given percentage change in
eachofthe two parameters ofinterest. Theelasticity
with respect to the insolvency ratio is negative (a
smaller insolvency ratio increases the liability) and
the elasticity with respect to asset risk is positive.
As noted earlier, for any set ofparameters, the ratio
of the two elasticities is independent of the
measured level ofthe liability so the elasticity ratio
given in the last column ofTable I may be the most
useful comparison ofthe relative importance ofthe
insolvency ratio and asset risk. This elasticity ratio
ranges between 7.4 and 19.8. Since these are point
elasticities, the comparison only holds for small
deviations from the base case. As a check on this,
arc (average) elasticities were calculated for finite
changes of approximately 20 percent in the two
parameters. For audit costs of 10 basis points, the
ratio of these arc elasticities was greater than 5.0;
for audit costs of 100 basis points, the ratio of arc
elasticities ranged between 1.6 and 3.4; and for a I
basis point audit cost, the ratio exceeded 13.0 for all
cases considered.
The conclusion drawn from this analysis is that a
given proportional deviation in the insolvencycondition from 1.0 has a significantly larger effect
on the size of the insurer's liability than an equal
deviation in asset risk from its base value. In other
words, the failure to maintain a target insolvency
ratio is significantly more important to the insurer
than the failure to maintain an asset risk target when
those failures are measured as equal percentage
deviations from the targets. This result is not
particularly surprising given our earlier
observations on the mechanism by which changes
in these two parameters affect the size of the
insurer's liability.
III. Conclusions
Bank deregulation implies an increased need for
deposit insurance reform because it has enhanced
the opportunities for insured institutions to exploit
the risk-taking incentives in the existing deposit
insurance system and likely reduced the ability of
the deposit insurers to limit their losses by selling
valuable franchises. Many current deposit insurance
reform proposals focus on risk-related insurance
premiums or other ways of pricing the risk that is
not differentially priced under the existing deposit
insurance structure. Control ofasset risk is clearly
important. However, our analysis of the relative
importance of asset risk and the insolvency ratio
implies that improved insolvency control is an even





K(bp) 0"2 X e<f> eO" le<f>1
eO"
I .01 1.0 -13.6 0.97 14.1
I .01 1.1 13.6 0.97 14.1
I .005 1.0 -19.4 0.98 19.8
I .005 1.1 -19.4 0.98 19.8
10 .01 1.0 -13.4 0.97 13.7
10 .01 1.1 13.4 1.00 13,2
10 .005 1.0 18.9 0.99 19.2
10 .005 l.l 18.9 1.06 17.8
100 .01 1.0 10.7 1.04 10.4
100 .01 1.1 -10.7 1.42 7.6
100 .005 1.0 -13.7 1.07 12.7
100 .005 1.1 13.7 1.84 7.4
1213FOOTNOTES
1. I use the term "banking system" in a broad sense to
include thrift institutions as well as commercial banks.
2. See Natter (1983b) for a legal analysis of the Treasury
proposal.
3. In a recent development, the Task Group on Regulation
of Financial Services has proposed some deposit insur-
ance reforms including higher insurance premiums for
banks that engage in risky activities.
4. See Mayer (1965).
5. Some of these changes, ironically, were set off by the
Interest Rate Adjustment Actof1966.
6. It is not coincidental that the FHLBB (1983) study of
deposit insurance dwells on interest rate risk. This was the
problem at S&Ls in the 1970s and early 1980s. Further-
more, a number of analysts believe they can measure
interest rate risk. See Beebe (1977, 1983) for evidence on
bank risk-taking behavior.
7. See Natter (1983a) p. 7-9.
8. See Zimmerman (1983).
9. The extent to which the increase in deposit brokerage is
due to deposit deregulation in 1980 and 1982 or to the
increase in insurance ceilings (to $100,000 per account) in
1980ortosomecombinationofthetwois an openquestion.
10. This statement may not be correct if the bank is near
insolvency. Then the competing interests of existing liability
holders andthe potential buyers of new liabilities mayprove
difficult to resolve.
11. The cover letter for the NCUA report states that"...risk
rating is theoretically and practically inconsistent with the
government's role as an 'insurer of last resort.' " The FDIC
summary statement on the subject is "The 'ideal system'
with premiums tied closely to risk is simply not feasible."
(FDIC (1983) p. 11.1). Also, see Horvitz (1983) for a discus-
sion of the difficulties in implementing risk-related pre-
miums. A counter to the arguments against risk-related
premiums is that lenders regularly set risk premiums on
corporate debt. Risk assessment in. private markets is
competitive. Can the risk assessment for setting deposit
insurance premiums be doneon a basisequivalentto com-
petitive risk assessment? If not, the corporate destanology
losses much of its power. Competitive bankrisk assess-
ment may be desirable andpracticable,.either through pri-
vate deposit insurance or through more reliance on non-
deposit liabilities or, assuggested bythe BushTask Group,
by private risk appraisal. Such considerations, while both
interesting and important, are beyond the scope of this
paper.
12. Horvitz (1983) p. 257 (hisernphasis).UnlessmOnitoring
is continuous, however, the risk of loss to the agency will
depend on the riskiness of the institution.
13. See Kane (1983a) p. 277 for a discussion of the insur-
ers' need for enhanced rights to take timely action.
14. See Beebe and Blank(1983) for adiscussion ofsome of
the i'Jroblems in measuring market net worth in financial
institutions.
15. SeeJarrow and Rudd (1983) forathorough treatmentof
modern option theory.
16. In defense of the model, itcan be pointed out that the
results obtained for the version of the modelreported here
are robustto some changes in thesimplifying assumptions.
See Pyle (1983).
17. Little information is available on the cost of examina-
tions. The evidence that is available suggests thatdirect
supervisory costs are less than 5 basis points per dollar of
deposits. However, there are indirectcostS for the institu-
tion being examined and, perhaps, for the supervisors as
well.
18. The bank assetvolatilities consideredinthe analysis lie
between the estimated volatility of long-term governments
(5 percent-6 percent peryear) and the average volatility of
common stocks (20 percent-30 percent)
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Page 8 The secondsentence ofthe first paragraph should read:
It is conceivable that this non-rate competition was less than perfect, and that it allowed
at least some banks to raise funds atthe margin at lowercost by issuing deposits.
Page 13 Column I
y == 8A/rr2
k == Ih {l-8 + [(1 + 8)2 + y]'h} > I
Page 13 Column 2 The second line ofEquation (4) should read:
{
8 (1 + 8) + IhY}
••. [(1 + 8)2 +y]\>
+ 8 + ~k + 25 [In ci5-)]
(j+
75